The Law of Ethical Identicality

There is a concept of fairness that seems so basic that it seems like it shouldn’t need stating: that I must apply the same rules to myself that I apply to everyone else. Still, I will be basing a lot on this idea so I will explore the soundness of this idea today. I will be calling this principle the Law of Ethical Identicality for what will become obvious reasons.

First, let us consider what we are trying to create: a system of ethics. This system is to be based, as much as is possible, on reason rather than whim. Also, as it is a system, it must be a set of logical rules which organizes the moral realm.

Now, let us take, as an example, me. Let’s suppose that it is right and just for me to do a thing, say, eat a sandwich. Now, let’s take another being which is, in all respects which are of concern in ethics, identical to me. It must be right and just for this other being to also eat a sandwich. For me to hold otherwise I would have to provide a reason for the difference in application of rules between myself and this other being. As this other being is, by definition, identical to myself, there can be no such reason.

You see, in a logical system, a given input will always give the same output (taking the state of the system as part of the input for anyone who really wants to press the issue). Thus, if I consider a given action, for a given person, in a given situation, and come to a certain conclusion, I must also conclude that my result would hold to any equivalent being in an equivalent situation considering an equivalent action. To claim different results in similar cases is to claim that 1 = 0, or any other logical impossibility you prefer.

Now this actually allows for a lot of room when interpreting the rules. I might hold, for instance, that there are some differences between myself and this other being. For one, I am myself, and this other being is not. For another, let’s suppose this other being has a different hair color than I do. The question then becomes whether or not these differences would be considered ethically relevant.

First, let’s take the hair color. Going back to our basic axioms, a thing cannot be ethically relevant unless it affects the conscious experience of some being in some notable way. This gives us a criterion to judge our differences. Obviously, hair color does not affect the experience of eating a sandwich in any way, therefore this difference is irrelevant, and I must still treat this other being as equivalent to myself.

Now let’s examine the idea that each being other than me is different in the fact that they are not me. That affects the experience of eating the sandwich. When I eat a sandwich, I experience it. When they eat a sandwich, I don’t. In this way my identity as myself seems ethically relevant. What is important to remember is that as a system of ethics, the rules will be applied the same way by each adherent to them. I can conceive situations in which I might think it would be good to eat the sandwich, and bad if this other being eats the sandwich. What I still cannot do, however, is hold that it is good for me to eat the sandwich, but that the other being must believe that it is bad for them to eat it. I must concede that if I think it is good for me to do, other similar beings will also think it is good for them to do. In this way, I must either concede that, as equivalent beings, each of our respective experiences of eating the sandwich have equal weight, or admit of internal contradictions within the logical system. Therefore, to remain internally coherent, I must dismiss my identity as self as an ethical factor, and treat myself equally with other equivalent beings within this ethical system.

Given that I cannot give myself special status within the system of ethics, I cannot distinguish whether I will be the agent or subject in a given ethical scenario. I must approach each dilemma as if all of the involved parties are separate from myself. It may be helpful to suggest that, while the concerned parties are the relevant topics of whether a thing is right or wrong, the actual decision about the rightness or wrongness must be determined by some uninterested third party whom has no knowledge of the identities of those involved. To honestly consider any ethical situation I must consider it as if I were not involved; I must become an impartial judge.

There is one more situation which requires a short statement, and that is the action of one being upon another. It should be fairly obvious by this point that if it is right for one being to take an action on another, it must still be right if the roles are reversed. Since the identities of the concerned cannot be distinguished by the impartial judge of ethics, they are interchangeable, and what applies to one, applies to all.