Hume's Guillotine and Conditional Ethics

The philosopher David Hume wrote a now famous paragraph discussing an idea which has come to be known as ‘Hume’s Guillotine’. This idea, more or less, is that ethics cannot be founded on facts alone, but that a value judgment must be made at some point, and that this value judgment is essentially arbitrary. This is not to say that facts do not relate to ethics and vice versa, only to say that facts alone are not sufficient to say what is good and what is bad. This idea is also known as the ‘Is-Ought Problem’ in ethics, as there is no way to infer what ‘ought-to-be’ from ‘what-is’.

In Hume’s own words:
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. (Source)

Some claim that this paragraph is being taken out of context, and that Hume meant something different than what most philosophers interpret it to mean, usually coinciding with the viewpoint they themselves espouse. Thus do weaker minds attempt to embellish their own works with a supposed affiliation with greatness. Nevertheless, whether it was Hume’s idea, or a misunderstanding which has been attributed to him, the idea should be judged on its own merits, and bears further consideration.

To illustrate this concept let us consider a common ethical judgment; for instance, we can say that it is morally wrong to kill the neighbors when they irritate us. This statement requires that, within the framework of the ethical system being used to make this determination, life is given some value. If life has no value, then it cannot be relevant what is done with it. The issue then becomes a question of what to value, with some going full circle upon themselves by trying to figure out if it is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ to value a certain thing.

This problem has been a thorn in many philosophers’ sides as they try to create a system of universal ethics, and several common strategies have been developed for coping with the issue. Some people have attempted to circumvent the problem by considering what is ‘good-for’ X or Y, and making ethical statements based on that. For instance, it is generally ‘bad-for’ a human being to have their head removed, so it must be ethically wrong to rip off people’s heads. Many prominent thinkers of our age, Sam Harris for one, have used this idea in an attempt to reduce ethics to a subset of science; that is, the science of what is good for people and what is bad for people.

Unfortunately, this merely sidesteps the real problem. Who is to say that what is good for people is important? Perhaps there is a goal worth sacrificing the good of humanity for? Perhaps we should make our ethical choices based on what is good for mosquitoes. How can we know that we have chosen the correct thing to value? While I agree with the conclusion that, in general, what is good for people is the right thing, I cannot abide the lapse in logic. There must be a way to determine that it is right to promote the welfare of humanity, or I cannot assert it.

Moral relativists have concluded that the value judgments being made are truly arbitrary, and that when a person says a thing is right or wrong any other person can merely claim to have different values with equal validity. This creates a scenario where 'Good' and 'Evil' are merely opinions, and there is no true ‘Right’ or ‘Wrong’, only one person’s preferences or another’s. In this line of thinking no person’s moral judgment may have any effect on any other person.

I agree that ethical statements are statements of value rather than statements of fact. I disagree, however, in the belief that the choice of values is arbitrary. As my work progresses I will be making the argument that some values are intrinsic to ethics, and that certain others are so widely held as to preclude any practical contention regarding their acceptance. I think I can then integrate these values into a cohesive value-system and proceed from that point to create a rational system of ethics. This system may not be a statement of fact, a description of the universe, or a divine command, but if we can find a way to agree on basic values we should be able to extrapolate from those values to a common set of ethical rules.

This idea will play a key role in the development of the overarching scheme of this system, and is why I call it ‘Conditional Ethics’. The system is conditional upon the acceptance of particular values, without which it is impotent. For instance, I might take it as a condition that human life has value. Under this condition I could then make the statement ‘murder is wrong’. I will try to take the most generic and unassuming conditions I can find, and will state them clearly and explicitly. I will try to only take conditions which have strong arguments in their support. Not all people will agree with my chosen values, but the people who do will find Conditional Ethics to be a solid basis for a rational morality which is right and just, and internally consistent. This is my goal; this is my work.